Access Denied: How Social Media Accounts Fall Outside the Scope of Intellectual Property Law and into the Realm of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by Miao, Tiffany
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 23 Volume XXIII 
Number 3 Volume XXIII Book 3 Article 5 
2013 
Access Denied: How Social Media Accounts Fall Outside the 
Scope of Intellectual Property Law and into the Realm of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Tiffany Miao 
Fordham University School of Law, tmiao@law.fordham.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tiffany Miao, Access Denied: How Social Media Accounts Fall Outside the Scope of Intellectual Property 
Law and into the Realm of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 23 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 
1017 (2013). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol23/iss3/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Access Denied: How Social Media Accounts Fall Outside the Scope of Intellectual 
Property Law and into the Realm of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Cover Page Footnote 
Managing Editor, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, Volume XXIII; J.D. 
Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, May 2013; B.S., Business Administration, University of 
California Berkeley, 2006. Endless thanks to Ryan Fox for his patient support and invaluable insight, and 
Meredith Hatic and the IPLJ staff for their helpful contributions. I would also like to thank Professor Ron 
Lazebnik for his input and guidance. Lastly, a special thanks to my friends for bearing with me while I 
“noted” and my family for never asking me, “What is a Note?” 
This note is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol23/iss3/5 
C05_MIAO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2013 3:40 PM 
 
1017 
Access Denied: How Social Media 
Accounts Fall Outside the Scope of 
Intellectual Property Law and into the 
Realm of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act 
Tiffany A. Miao 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1018 
I.  BACKGROUND: SOCIAL MEDIA AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAWS ........................................................ 1021 
A.  The Development of Social Media ....................... 1021 
B.  Recent Litigation .................................................. 1022 
C.  Relevant Intellectual Property Regimes ............... 1025 
1.  Trademark Law .............................................. 1026 
2.  Copyright Law ............................................... 1028 
a)  Originality ................................................ 1029 
b)  Work-Made-For-Hire ............................... 1029 
3.  Trade Secrets Law .......................................... 1031 
4.  The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ............. 1033 
b)  Scope of “Authorization” ......................... 1036 
c)  Definition of “Loss” ................................. 1037 
II.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS FAIL TO 
ESTABLISH OWNERSHIP RIGHTS TO SOCIAL MEDIA 
ACCOUNTS ................................................................. 1038 
 
  Managing Editor, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law 
Journal, Volume XXIII; J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, May 2013; 
B.S., Business Administration, University of California Berkeley, 2006.  Endless thanks 
to Ryan Fox for his patient support and invaluable insight, and Meredith Hatic and the 
IPLJ staff for their helpful contributions.  I would also like to thank Professor Ron 
Lazebnik for his input and guidance.  Lastly, a special thanks to my friends for bearing 
with me while I “noted” and my family for never asking me, “What is a Note?” 
C05_MIAO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2013  3:40 PM 
1018 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1017 
A.  Intellectual Property Laws as Applied to Social 
Media Accounts: Failure to Protect Key Assets .. 1039 
1.  Trademark ...................................................... 1039 
a)  Likelihood of Confusion .......................... 1039 
b)  Limitations ............................................... 1041 
2.  Copyright ....................................................... 1041 
a)  Individual Posts ........................................ 1042 
b)  As a Compilation ..................................... 1043 
c)  Work-Made-For-Hire ............................... 1044 
d)  Limitations ............................................... 1046 
3.  Trade Secrets .................................................. 1047 
a)  Access Information .................................. 1048 
b)  Subscriber Lists ........................................ 1049 
c)  Limitations ............................................... 1052 
B.  Social Media Accounts Are Not Intellectual 
Property ............................................................... 1053 
III.  THE CFAA AS THE APPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK FOR 
ESTABLISHING OWNERSHIP OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
ACCOUNTS ................................................................. 1054 
A.  Potential Claims: The Intentional Access 
Subsection and The Intent to Defraud Subsection 1055 
1.  Scope of Authorization .................................. 1056 
2.  Intent .............................................................. 1057 
3.  Fraud .............................................................. 1058 
4.  $5,000 Loss .................................................... 1059 




Friendship is priceless, but a Facebook friend—probably $2.50.  
In November 2011, the cellphone blog and review company 
PhoneDog filed a lawsuit claiming each follower to a Twitter 
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account is worth $2.50.1  With 17,000 Twitter followers at $2.50 
each, a lot of money was at stake.  In fact, PhoneDog claimed a 
total of $340,000 in damages: $42,500 for each of the eight months 
after its former employee, Noah Kravitz, changed the Twitter 
account from “@PhoneDog_Noah” to “@noahkravitz.”2  Although 
social media began as a predominately interpersonal method of 
connecting with friends and family, it has now immersed itself in 
the business world. 
As consumers become inextricably tied to their social 
networks, businesses too are now compelled to establish their 
presence on social media.3  For example, many company websites 
now include a Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn plugin.4  Moreover, 
companies have hired employees for the sole purpose of managing 
and updating their social media accounts (“SMAs”).5  In fact, the 
use of SMAs span across industries.  For example, the National 
Basketball Association (“NBA”) created the Twitter account 
“@NBA_Labor” to communicate directly with fans and the media 
about the 2011 season lockout, seeking to also clarify any rumors 
or misinformation that might have been floating around.6  Even 
utility companies have established SMAs to engage stakeholders in 
a discussion about clean energy and to spread the word about smart 
grids.7  Consequently, this unprecedented realm of interaction has 
left businesses, individuals, and the legal community struggling to 
determine the acceptable boundaries within social media.  This 
challenge stems from the desire to protect legitimate business 
interests and employees’ rights and mobility with the innovative 
and progressive potential provided through social networks. 
 
 1 PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. C 11 03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 8, 2011). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See Carolyn Elefant, The “Power” of Social Media: Legal Issues & Best Practices 
for Utilities Engaging in Social Media, 32 ENERGY L. J. 1, 4 (2011).  
 4 See Leyl Master Black, How To: Use Facebook Plugins on Your Website, 
MASHABLE.COM (Mar. 22, 2011), available at http://mashable.com/2011/03/22/facebook-
social-plugins-2. 
 5 See cases cited infra Part I.B. 
 6 Mike Saechang, Twitter’s Impact on the NBA Lockout, EDELMAN DIGITAL (Dec. 20, 
2011), available at http://www.edelmandigital.com/2011/12/20/twitter-nba-lockout. 
 7 See Elefant, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
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Given the benefits and competitive necessity, for at least some 
businesses, to use social media, explicit ownership of an SMA 
allows a business to control how and what it communicates to its 
customers and to the public.  This scope of ownership can be 
determined based upon control over the three key assets of an 
SMA: access information, posted content, and subscriber lists.  
Access information—the login and password—is a crucial element 
of ownership, without which a business loses its ability to 
communicate to its consumers and public.8  Another valuable asset 
is the content posted.  SMA posts provide a platform for virtually 
instantaneous information exchange between consumers and the 
business, where consumers can respond to new products or 
features and businesses can implement targeted marketing.9  The 
third asset is the subscribers.  Subscribers to an SMA are the 
motivation behind creating an SMA, and arguably these 
subscribers represent monetary value to the company.10  
Consequently, the key for employers in protecting their business’s 
SMA is being able to claim ownership over all three assets—the 
password, content, and subscriber list. 
This Note will argue that intellectual property law provides an 
inappropriate legal framework for employers in claiming 
ownership rights over their SMAs, because each of the relevant 
intellectual property regimes fails to address all three assets of an 
SMA.  Part I of this Note provides a brief description of social 
media including the current litigation over SMAs, and lays out the 
relevant legal frameworks—Trademark, Copyright, Trade Secrets, 
and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”).  Part II 
examines how the three intellectual property regimes apply to 
SMAs and reveals how they fail to provide adequate ownership 
 
 8 In many of the current cases involving SMAs, the litigation stemmed from one party 
changing the access information to prevent the other party from accessing the account. 
See, e.g., PhoneDog, 2011 WL 5415612 at *1 (describing how the suit ensued after the 
former employee changed the Twitter handle and password). 
 9 See Bart Perkins, Is Social Connectivity Friend or Foe to Corporations?, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://www.computerworld.com 
/s/article/9223200/Bart_Perkins_Is_social_connectivity_friend_or_foe_to_corporations_. 
 10 See John Biggs, A Dispute Over Who Owns a Twitter Account Goes to Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 25, 2011, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/26/ 
technology/lawsuit-may-determine-who-owns-a-twitter-account.html.  
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protection over the main assets of an SMA.  In Part III, this Note 
proposes the CFAA as a more effective framework for asserting 
account ownership. 
I. BACKGROUND: SOCIAL MEDIA AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAWS 
A. The Development of Social Media 
“Social media” is a term used to describe web-based 
technologies that provide a platform for interactive information 
exchange, user-created content, and visible social connections.11  
These websites typically allow users to create their own public 
profiles and connect with other users based on shared interests 
such as music, movies, other activities, and even mutual friends.12  
Typically, through public profiles, users are able to provide basic 
personal information, upload photos, and post commentary.  Once 
users are connected, each may view and browse other users’ 
profiles.  The most recognized and used social media websites 
include Facebook.com, Twitter.com, and Linkedin.com.13 
What began as personal social media—one person establishing 
connections with friends, family members, and acquaintances14—
has now evolved into a multi-million dollar industry.15  The first 
social media websites were developed with a focus on the 
individual user and forming personal connections with friends or 
new acquaintances.16  This new motivation marked a shift from 
already-existing Interest-based platforms—namely discussion 
boards—toward a platform more along the lines of personal 
networks, with the individual user at the center.17  Due to the 
 
 11 See generally Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, 
History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMC’N 210 (2007), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2007.00393.x/pdf. 
 12 See id. at 212–13. 
 13 See Sorav Jain, 40 Most Popular Social Networking Sites of the World, 
SOCIALMEDIA TODAY (Oct. 6, 2012), http://socialmediatoday.com/node/195917. 
 14 See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 11, at 214–15. 
 15 See e.g., John Letzing, LinkedIn Sets Tone for Social Networks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
10, 2012, at B7. 
 16 See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 11, at 214–15. 
 17 See id. at 219. 
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popularity and growth of social media websites, account holders 
have expanded from individuals to businesses, and uses have 
expanded from simply staying connected with friends to furthering 
corporate initiatives.18  Given the growing connectedness between 
individuals via social media, companies are now beginning to 
contemplate social media’s potentially high-impact role for their 
business and in their business.19 
B. Recent Litigation 
In the past few years, the increasing role of social media in the 
corporate world has created a niche of lawsuits between employers 
and employees.  Looking at the background of just a few of these 
cases helps to introduce the difficulty in using—or misusing—
intellectual property claims to assert ownership rights over an 
SMA.  Along with PhoneDog, two other noteworthy cases that 
demonstrate this challenge include Ardis Health, LLC v. Nankivell 
and Eagle v. Morgan. 
In PhoneDog, the company hired Kravitz as a product reviewer 
and video blogger.  PhoneDog gave Kravtiz permission to access 
and use the Twitter account “@PhoneDog_Noah,” in conjunction 
with promoting the company’s services.20  After over four years 
with PhoneDog, Kravitz resigned, and when the company asked 
him to hand over the account, Kravitz instead changed the Twitter 
handle to “@noahkravitz.”21  In response, PhoneDog sued Kravtiz, 
alleging, among other claims, misappropriation of its trade 
 
 18 For example, Twitter has an entire website dedicated to professional Twitter 
accounts.  According to the website, a business’ Twitter account allows the company to 
quickly share information, gather market intelligence and insights, and build relationships 
with people who care about company. See Twitter 101, TWITTER, 
https://business.twitter.com/twitter-101 (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).  Similarly, Facebook 
also has an entire website designated for businesses, providing an in depth guide for 
creating a company Facebook page, promoting the page, and expanding the page. See 
Facebook for Business, FACEBOOk, https://www.facebook.com/business/build (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
 19  See Perkins, supra note 9. 
 20 PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. C 11 03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 8, 2011). 
 21 Id. 
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secrets—specifically its account password and Twitter followers.22  
The district court declined to dismiss PhoneDog’s claim for 
misappropriation of trade secrets, suggesting that Twitter followers 
and a Twitter password may in fact be trade secrets.23  In the end, 
the parties settled,24 leaving open the issues of whether a password 
and followers are trade secrets, and more broadly, what legal 
framework should be applied in determining the ownership rights 
to an SMA. 
Eagle v. Morgan is an example of an employer-employee 
dispute over a LinkedIn account that incorporates CFAA and 
Lanham Act claims.25  In 1987 Linda Eagle co-founded Edcomm, 
a banking education company.26  During her later years of 
employment with Edcomm,27 Eagle created and used the LinkedIn 
account to develop and maintain an extensive network of 
professional contacts for the business.28  In 2011, after her 
termination, Eagle attempted to access the account; however, the 
company had already changed the account name, photograph, and 
password.29  Immediately, Eagle filed suit, pro se, against her 
employers.  In October 2012, just over a year later, the district 
court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment for 
both Eagle’s CFAA and Lanham Act claims.30  In doing so, the 
 
 22 See id. at *1 (listing all of PhoneDog’s claims, which include “(1) misappropriation 
of trade secrets; (2) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (3) 
negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; and (4) conversion”). 
 23 See id. at *10 (dismissing PhoneDog’s intentional and negligent interference with 
prospective economic advantage claims). 
 24 See Stipulation for Dismissal After Settlement, PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. 3:11-cv-
03474-MEJ, 2013 WL 207773 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013). 
 25 Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 WL 4739436, at *2 ( E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012).  
In addition to the federal claims, the plaintiff also asserted state law claims including: (1) 
unauthorized use of name in violation of 42 PA. CON. STAT. § 8316 (2003); (2) invasion 
of privacy by misappropriation of identity; (3) misappropriation of publicity; (4) identity 
theft; (5) conversion; (6) tortious interference with contract; (7) civil conspiracy; and (8) 
civil aiding and abetting. See id. 
 26 See id. at *1. 
 27 In 2010, Edcomm was bought out by SISCOM, which employed the individual 
defendants to this suit. See id. at *1. 
 28 Id. at *1. 
 29 Id. at *2. 
 30 Id. at *9.  The district court did, however, deny the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment for Eagle’s state law claims.  The parties went to trial on October 16, 2012. See 
id.  On March 12, 2013, the district court issued its decision, finding the results of the 
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court stated Eagle failed to present “legally cognizable loss or 
damages” to sustain her CFAA claim31 and also failed to provide 
sufficient evidence of a lack of confusion to corroborate her 
Lanham Act claim.32 
In contrast to the first two cases, Ardis Health LLC v. Nankivell 
is an example of what can be considered a more straightforward 
SMA dispute—the former employee never changed the account 
information, never attempted to use the SMAs after termination, 
and the employer had a written agreement in place.33  Ashleigh 
Nankivell was hired as a Video and Social Media producer by two 
herbal and beauty product companies owned by the same founder, 
Jordan Finger.  Her responsibilities included maintaining the 
usernames, passwords, and login information to the company’s 
SMAs and other third party server accounts.34  After Nankivell was 
terminated, she refused to return the account’s access information, 
and the employer sued on the basis of a work-for-hire agreement 
“within the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1976.”35  In its 
motion for a preliminary injunction to return the access 
information, the district court stated that employers “own[ed] the 
rights to the Access Information,”36 and would suffer irreparable 
harm as a result of Nankivell’s refusal to return the access 
information.37 
The above cases demonstrate the difficulty in fitting social 
media accounts into existing intellectual property regimes—with 
courts entertaining the possibility that an SMA may fall within 
trade secrets law,38 may be protected by trademark law,39 or may 
 
case “a somewhat mixed bag for both sides.”  See Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, slip op. 
at *17 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013).  Despite the wins and losses on the claims for both 
parties, the court ultimately ruled that Eagle failed to provide sufficient evidence in 
support of compensatory and punitive damages. See id.  
 31 Id. at *3. 
 32 Id. at *8. 
 33 Ardis Health, LLC v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013(NRB), 2011 WL 4965172, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct 19, 2011). 
 34 Id. at *2. 
 35 See id. at *1. 
 36 Id. at *3. 
 37 Id.  
 38 See, e.g., PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. C 11 03474 MEJ, 2011 WL5415612 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 8, 2011) (finding an employer sufficiently alleged a misappropriation of trade 
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simply fall outside intellectual property law altogether.40  Thus far 
in the development of appropriate legal regimes to tackle social 
media issues broadly, it is clear that, as far as ownership rights are 
concerned, courts have struggled to fit SMAs into existing 
intellectual property regimes. 
Moreover, these cases reiterate the specific assets of value 
associated with an SMA.  For example, in PhoneDog, the 
employer primarily valued the followers (“subscribers”), whereas 
in Eagle, the employee was suing over the interactive platform of 
her LinkedIn account, and in Ardis Health, the employers 
specifically sought the username and password (“access 
information”).  Despite the varying focuses of the cases, in at least 
at one point in litigation, the parties demonstrated an interest in all 
three assets of an SMA: (1) the subscribers; (2) the interactive 
platform/content; and (3) the access information.  As such, and 
given the variety of social media networks (i.e., Facebook and 
Twitter accounts), this Note will focus the analysis of ownership 
rights over social media accounts based on a “generic SMA” 
embodying these three main assets. 
C. Relevant Intellectual Property Regimes 
Intellectual property law is commonly viewed as a means of 
protection for owners of creative works—securing for the owner 
the returns on their creative labor.  For many, the security of this 
protection is what is believed to incentivize individuals and 
businesses to create.  For copyright and patent law, this right stems 
from Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which 
 
secrets claim over a Twitter account); Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 
1074–77 (D. Colo. 2012) (finding an employer sufficiently alleged a misappropriation of 
trade secrets claim over a MySpace account). 
 39 See, e.g., Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., Ltd., No. 10-C7811, 2011 WL 
6101949 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011) (denying a summary judgment motion against an 
employee’s Lanham Act claim over the use of a Twitter and Facebook account); cf. Eagle 
v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 WL 4739436 ( E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012) (granting a motion 
to dismiss an employee’s Lanham Act claim for failing to provide sufficient evidence of a 
likelihood of confusion over a LinkedIn account). 
 40 See, e.g., Ardis Health, 2011 WL 4965172.  And arguably all the cases mentioned in 
this section, given their lack of a concrete decision, contribute to this conclusion. See 
sources cited supra notes 38–39. 
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serves “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
[secures] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”41  Trademark 
law, through the Lanham Act, offers protection against unfair 
competition42 and “secur[es] to a mark’s owner the goodwill of his 
business.”43  Although not a federal intellectual property regime, 
trade secrets law, most recognized as an adopted form of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act,44 protects the owner of a secret, or at 
least not generally known discovery or work, from unlawful 
disclosure or use.45  With this broad backdrop of intellectual 
property law—which serves to incentivize creativity by protecting 
the exclusive ownership rights to a work—this section will provide 
a basic background of the intellectual property regimes relevant to 
SMAs, beginning with trademark law, followed by copyright law, 
and ending with trade secrets law. 
1. Trademark Law 
The statutory definition of a trademark includes “any word, 
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . to 
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique 
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate 
the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”46  
Trademark infringement claims are generally brought under 
Lanham Act § 43(a), which governs false designations of origin, 
false descriptions, and dilution.  A claim under section 43(a) 
requires the plaintiff to satisfy two elements: (1) that the mark is 
protectable and (2) that there is a likelihood of consumer 
confusion.47  For the purposes of this Note, it will be assumed that 
the employer holds a protectable trademark insomuch as it satisfies 
 
 41 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 42 Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), ch. 540, 50 Stat. 427 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 43 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992). 
 44 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). 
 45 See Kewanee Oil Co., v. Bicron Corp, 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974). 
 46 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 47 See Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc. v. Archipelago Holdings, LLC, 336 F. Supp. 2d 294, 
304 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).   
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the first element of section 43(a).48  Therefore, as demonstrated in 
Eagle v. Morgan, the relevant issue is whether the continued use of 
a social media account by a former employee leads to a likelihood 
of consumer confusion.49 
A likelihood of consumer confusion is “[t]he core element of 
trademark infringement.”50  Consumer confusion exists so long as 
the public “belie[ves] that the mark’s owner sponsored or 
otherwise approved the use of the trademark.”51  The analysis 
involves a multi-factor balancing test, with different courts 
applying their own version of the test.52  Factors that are usually 
considered include: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) similarity 
between the marks; (3) similarity between the products or services 
offered; (4) actual confusion; (5) the defendant’s intent; (6) 
consumer care and sophistication; (7) likelihood of expanding 
products or services offered; and (8) marketing channels used.53  
Despite the difference in factors considered, the circuit courts all 
view the analysis as a fact-specific inquiry where no one factor 
 
 48 To delve into whether a business’s trademark is protectable would digress from the 
purpose of this Note.  For example, PhoneDog is a registered trademark with the PTO. 
See PHONEDOG, Registration No. 3,828,071.   
 49 See Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 WL 4739436 ( E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012).  
Although the court found the employee failed to prove her Lanham act claim, the facts of 
that case differ slightly than this scenario because Eagle did not continue to use the 
LinkedIn account after her termination. Id. at *1. 
 50 Brookfield Commc’n, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (quoting Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th cir. 
1993)). 
 51 Star Indus. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 384 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204–05 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
 52 See 4 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:19 (4th ed. 
2013). 
 53 See e.g., Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687 
(6th Cir. 2003); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).  Some 
circuits apply slightly different factors.  For example, the Second Circuit “Polaroid” test 
does not include “marketing channels used” as a separate factor, but rather incorporates 
the use of marking channels under its “proximity” factor; and instead, includes a separate 
factor of “quality of defendant’s products or services.” See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad 
Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) cert denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961); see also 4 
McCARTHY, supra note 52, § 23:19. 
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necessarily weighs more than another,54 and where the burden of 
proving a likelihood of confusion belongs to the plaintiff.55 
There is a spectrum of scenarios to which the continued use of 
an SMA may lead to consumer confusion.  At one end, the former 
employee retains the account and does not change the name or any 
other aspect of the account.  At the opposite end of the spectrum, 
the former employee has changed the name so that it no longer 
includes the protected mark.  In the grey area between these poles 
exist situations when the former employee changes the name of the 
account but the new name may be reminiscent of the original 
name.  Regardless of where the facts fall on this spectrum, a court 
would still apply a likelihood of confusion analysis. 
2. Copyright Law 
The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship,”56 
where “originality requires independent creation plus a modicum 
of creativity.”57  In order for a social media account to receive 
protection under the Copyright Act, the “work” must be original—
”[t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality”58—and the work 
must be “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”59  Three 
possible ways to view the “work” of an SMA include: (1) the work 
in terms of each individual post, (2) the SMA as a compilation, or 
(3) the SMA as a work-for-hire.  The following section will briefly 
explain only the first requirement—originality—as it is the more 
controversial issue, and the issue of fixation will not be addressed 
since it is unlikely to be disputed.60 
 
 54 Star Indus., 412 F.3d at 384 (“Our analysis is not mechanical, but rather, focuses on 
the ultimate question of whether, looking at the products in their totality, consumers are 
likely to be confused.”); Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054 (“[T]he relative importance of each 
individual factor will be case-specific.”).  
 55 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 17–18 
(2004). 
 56 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 57 Feist Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
 58 Id. at 345. 
 59 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 60 Fixation requires a work to be “fixed in a tangible medium of expression when its 
embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  Generally, courts apply the fixation requirement broadly. See 
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a) Originality 
As stated above, “[t]he sine qua non of copyright is 
originality,” and the “work must be original to the author.”61  For a 
work to be considered original, it must be independently created by 
the author and, most significantly, “posse[ss] at least some 
minimal degree of creativity.”62  Originality does not require 
novelty; in fact, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely 
low.”63  The range of works found to be original span from an 
opening sentence of a poem64 to sculptures65 to computer 
programs.66  One fundamental aspect of copyright law is that “no 
one may claim originality as to facts.”67  A key factor in 
determining whether an SMA’s individual posts or the whole 
compilation of posts are protected by copyright is if either 
possesses the requisite originality. 
b) Work-Made-For-Hire 
The Copyright Act states that ownership of the copyright 
“vests initially in the author or authors of the work.”68  An 
exception exists for “works made for hire,” where “the employer 
or other person for whom the work is prepared is considered the 
author.”69  Under the Copyright Act, there are two mutually 
 
Williams Elecs, Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3d Cir. 1982) (“By its broad 
language, Congress opted for an expansive interpretation of the term[] ‘fixation’. . . .”).  
An SMA, similar to video games and computer programs which have been established as 
“fixed,” is most likely also sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
particularly where the SMA is stored in the social media platform’s server and posts 
remain on account pages of the owners and subscribers. See Williams Elec., 685 F.2d at 
874–75; Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) (both finding 
storage in memory devices satisfies the fixation requirement).  
 61 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Stern v. Does, No. CV 09—01986 DMG (PLAx), 2011 WL 997230, (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 10, 2011), aff’d  No. 11-55436, 2013 WL 1137390 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2013). 
 65 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (CCNV), 490 U.S. 730, 731 (1989).     
 66 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). 
 67 Feist, 499 U.S. at 437 (quoting 1 NIMMER & D. NIMMER, Copyright §§ 2.01[A], [B] 
(1990)). 
 68 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006). 
 69 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
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exclusive ways in which a work may be considered a work-made-
for-hire: (1) as a work “prepared by an employee within the scope 
of his or her employment,”70 or (2) as a “specially ordered or 
commissioned” work, as specified in a written instrument, by an 
independent contractor.71  The Act enumerates the nine categories 
of “specially ordered or commissioned” works that qualify as 
works-made-for-hire: 
(1)  As a contribution to a collective work, 
(2) As a part of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, 
(3)  As an translation, 
(4)  As a supplementary work (a work prepared for 
publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by 
another author for the purpose of introducing, 
concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, 
commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the 
other work), 
(5)  As a compilation, 
(6)  As an instructional text, 
(7)  As a test, 
(8)  As answer material for a test, or 
(9)  As an atlas.72 
Given the two prongs of the work-made-for-hire provision, the 
threshold issue is whether the individual hired to manage the SMA 
qualifies as an employee or rather as an independent contractor.73  
With an employee, the ownership of the copyright would belong to 
the company.  With an independent contractor, the ownership of 
the copyright would belong to the hired party if it does not fall 
within one of the nine categories of “specially ordered or 
commissioned” works.  The statute does not provide a definition of 
employee; however, the Supreme Court has held that “the term 
‘employee’ should be understood in light of the general common 
law of agency.”74  To determine whether a hired party is an 
 
 70 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (2006).   
 71 See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2); see also CCNV, 490 U.S. 730, 731 (1989).     
 72 See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). 
 73 See CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751. 
 74 Id. at 741. 
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employee as opposed to an independent contractor, courts look to 
various factors to determine how much control the hiring party 
possesses and the “means by which the product is accomplished.”75 
The work-made-for-hire analysis presents another possible 
framework for determining ownership rights to an SMA.76  When a 
business hires an individual to create or manage the SMA, the 
hired party is generally responsible for posts, often in connection 
with a company’s marketing objectives,77 maintaining any 
usernames and passwords,78 and, in some situations, a hired party 
is also given a company laptop or computer to work from.79  As 
exemplified by PhoneDog, the relationship between the company 
and hired party is not always clearly defined in a written 
agreement.80  And, even when there is an agreement in place, 
ownership of any account may still be disputed.81  Regardless, the 
analysis turns on whether the hired party is an employee or 
independent contractor. 
3. Trade Secrets Law 
Trade secrets law is a common law intellectual property 
regime.  The Uniform Law Commission published the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) with the intention of unifying this 
body of law amongst the states.  So far, forty-six states have 
adopted the UTSA.  For the purposes of this Note, the discussion 
 
 75 Id. at 751.  A court will also consider (1) the skill required; (2) the source of the 
instrumentalities and tools; (3) the location of the work; (4) the duration of the 
relationship between the parties; (5) whether the hiring party has the right to assign 
additional projects to the hired party; (6) the extent of the hired party’s discretion over 
when and how long to work; (7) the method of payment; (8) the hired party’s role in 
hiring and paying assistants; (9) whether the work is part of the regular business of the 
hiring party; (10) whether the hiring party is in business; (11) the provision of employees 
benefits; (12) and the tax treatment of the hired party.  None of these factors are 
dispositive.  Id. at 751–52. 
 76 See id. at 750 (stating Congress’ goal behind the work-made-for-hire provision was 
to “ensur[e] predictability through advance planning”).  
 77 See, e.g., Ardis Health, LLC v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013(NRB), 2011 WL 
4965172, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 19, 2011). 
 78 See, e.g., id. 
 79 See, e.g., id. 
 80 See, e.g., PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11 03474 MEJ, 2011 WL5415612 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 8, 2011). 
 81 See, e.g., Ardis Health, 2011 WL 4965172. 
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will refer to the language in the UTSA rather than any state-
specific version of the act.  The key elements of a trade secret can 
be broke down as: 
(1)  “information, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program device, method, technique or 
process, that: 
(2)  derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, 
(3)  from not being generally known to, and not 
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use, and 
(4)  is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”82 
Classic examples of trade secrets include formulas (i.e., Coca-
Cola’s beverage formula),83 customer lists,84 sales or marketing 
information and other forms of confidential information.85  The 
trade secret holder is protected “against the disclosure or 
unauthorized use of the trade secret.”86  As a corollary, the trade 
secret is not protected from “discovery by fair and honest means, 
such as by independent invention, accidental disclosure, or by so-
called reverse engineering.”87  The value of trade secret protection 
is the preservation of the discovery and its commercial advantages 
exclusively to the benefit of the inventor, while sanctioning “the 
competitor who by unfair means, or as the beneficiary of a broke 
 
 82 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985). 
 83 See William Lee Adams, Is This the Real Thing? Coca-Cola’s Secret Formula 
‘Discovered,’ TIME (Feb. 15, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/02/15/is-this-the-
real-thing-coca-colas-secret-formula-discovered.  
 84 See, e.g., Suzanne Kapner, BofA Sues Ex-Employees Over ‘Trade Secrets,’ FT.COM 
(Dec. 9, 2010, 9:40 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/626b961c-03d6-11e0-8c3f-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2OTyRiDUZ. 
 85 See, e.g., Azam Ahmed, Ex-Citadel Employee Charged with Stealing Trade Secrets, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2011, 5:03 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/ex-
citadel-employee-charged-with-stealing-trade-secrets. 
 86 Kewanee Oil Co., v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475–76 (1974). 
 87 Id. at 477. 
C05_MIAO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2013  3:40 PM 
2013] SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS AND THE CFAA 1033 
faith, obtains the desired knowledge without himself paying the 
price in labor, money, or machines expended by the discover.”88 
As evidenced in PhoneDog, a business may allege trade secret 
claims for the misappropriation of the access information and 
subscribers of its social media account.  The threshold issue is the 
existence of a trade secret—whether or not the access information 
or the subscriber list constitute trade secrets. 
4. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) is the primary 
piece of legislation concerning computer fraud violations.  The 
CFAA was enacted in 1986, when Congress sought to address 
rising concerns of computer-related crimes.89  More specifically, 
Congress created the statute in response to the threat of “hackers” 
gaining access to highly private information belonging to the 
government and financial institutions.90  According to the 
legislative history, Congress viewed the statute as “doing for 
computers what trespass and burglary laws did for real property.”91  
Although the CFAA began as a criminal statute, Congress included 
in its 1994 amendments a private civil cause of action, codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).92  Over the years, Congress has recognized 
the evolution of computers and computer use and amended the 
statute accordingly.93  Not only did Congress expand the statute to 
include the private right of action, it also broadened the scope of 
targeted computers from “federal interest computers” to all 
“protected computers,”94 and removed the requirement that 
 
 88 Id. at 482 (quoting A. O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 
539 (6th Cir. 1934). 
 89 See Shawn E. Tuma, “What Does CFAA Mean And Why Should I Care?”—A 
Primer On The Computer Fraud And Abuse Act For Civil Litigators, 63 S.C. L. REV. 
141, 155–56 (2011). 
 90 Matthew Kapitanyan, Beyond Wargames: How the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Should be Interpreted in the Employment Context, 7 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 
405, 410 (2012).  
 91 Id.  
 92 See Graham M. Liccardi, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for 
Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 155, 160 
(2008). 
 93 Kapitanyan, supra note 90, at 415. 
 94 Id. 
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information under section 1030(g), subsection (a)(2)(C) involve 
interstate or foreign communication.95 
While the majority of CFAA claims remain directed at “classic 
hacking activities,”96 there has been a steep increase in civil 
claims.  “Employers . . . are increasingly taking advantage of the 
CFAA’s civil remedies to sue former employees and their new 
companies who seek a competitive edge through wrongful use of 
information from the former employer’s computer system.”97  As 
such, section 1030(g) civil claims present a ripe framework for 
determining SMA ownership. 
A civil action may be asserted under section 1030(g) so long as 
it involves any of the seven violations under section 1030(a) and at 
least one of the five elements under section 1030(c)(4)(A)(i) (“the 
Cause subsection”).98  The most common element claimed under 
the Cause subsection is subsection (c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (“the $5,000 loss 
element”), which requires that one or more persons suffered at 
least $5,000 in losses during any one-year period.99  The 
subsections that speak to the issue of an employer-employee 
dispute over SMA ownership consist of section 1030(a)(2)(C)100 
(“the Intentional Access subsection”) and section 1030(a)(4) (“the 
Intent to Defraud subsection”).101 
To better understand the applicability of the CFAA to SMAs, 
this section will outline the pertinent elements facing a CFAA 
claim over an SMA: (1) the definition of a “computer,” (2) the 
scope of “authorization,” and (3) “loss.” 
 
 95 This clause was omitted in September 2008 under the Identity Theft Enforcement 
and Restitution Act. See Pub. L. 110-326, § 203, 112 Stat. 3560, 3561 (2008).  
 96 P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party and Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 
504, 510 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 97 Id. (quoting Pac. Aerospace & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1196 
(E.D. Wash. 2003)). 
 98 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006). 
 99 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (“loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period 
(and, for purposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the 
United States only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more 
other protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value”); See Kyle W. Brenton, 
Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Two Problems and Two 
Solutions, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 429, 435 (2009). 
 100 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). 
 101 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).   
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a) Definition of a “Computer” 
The CFAA defines a “computer” as 
an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or 
other high speed data processing device performing 
logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and 
includes any data storage facility or 
communications facility directly related to or 
operating in conjunction with such device, but such 
term does not include an automated typewriter or 
typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other 
similar device;102 
and the relevant definition of a “protected computer” as 
a computer which is used in interstate or foreign 
commerce or communication, including a computer 
located outside the United States that is used in a 
manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce 
or communication of the United States.103 
Courts have found that a cell phone,104 game console,105 and 
website106 all qualify as a “computer” under the CFAA.  In fact, 
some commentators have stated that effectively any computer 
connected to the Internet is a “computer” under the CFAA.107 
In an SMA ownership dispute between an employer and 
employee, there are two possible “computers” at issue: the first 
being the social media website and the second being the actual 
SMA.  As mentioned, courts recognize websites as “computers” 
under the CFAA, due to the fact that in order for a website to 
access the Internet, it must access its host server.108  Applying this 
 
 102 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1). 
 103 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B). 
 104 See United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 105 See Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC v. Hotz, No. CV  110167, 2011 WL 347137, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011). 
 106 See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 581 (1st Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 456–57 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 107 Brenton, supra note 99, at 433; Tuma, supra note 89, at 168–71; Liccardi, supra 
note 92, at 60. 
 108 Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 456–57 (reasoning that for a website to access the Internet, it 
must access a server hosting the website). 
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reasoning to an individual SMA suggests that it is also a 
“computer.”  The entirety of an SMA, including the content 
posted, login information, messages, and photos, is also stored 
within servers.109  And, given the social media website’s and an 
SMA’s connection to the Internet, it would follow that each would 
also be a “protected computer” under the CFAA.  Lastly, and 
perhaps more important to CFAA protection, any individual 
harmed by the unlawful access of a protected computer has 
standing to sue—not limited the owner of the computer.110 
b) Scope of “Authorization” 
A major issue in both (a)(2)(C) and (a)(4) claims is the phrase 
“without authorization, or exceeds authorized access.”111  The 
scope of the phrase is probably the most litigated issue in CFAA 
cases.112  Despite the fact that the statute explicitly defines 
“exceeds authorized access,”113 the courts are split as to how and 
when access becomes unauthorized in an employment context.114 
The Seventh Circuit, in International Airports Centers, LLC v. 
Citrin, established an agency-based view of the statute, where an 
employee breaches her duty of loyalty to the employer when she 
accesses the employer’s computer and uses the information 
obtained in a manner adverse to the employer’s economic 
interest.115  In breaching her duty of loyalty, she terminates her 
agency relationship with the employer such that she no longer has 
 
 109 See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, How Social Networking Works, ITWORLD (Jan. 7, 
2010, 12:54 PM), http://www.itworld.com/software/91803/how-social-networking-
works. 
 110 See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004) (reversing the 
district courts reading of an “ownership or control requirement into the Act,” on grounds 
that the language of the Act clearly permits a civil remedy to “[a]ny person”). 
 111 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C), 1030(a)(4). 
 112 See Tuma, supra note 89, at 171. 
 113 18 U.S.C § 1030(e)(6).  “[T]he term ‘exceeds authorized access’ means to access a 
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the 
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.” Id. 
 114 Compare United States v. Nosal (Nosal II), 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), 
with United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. John, 
597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010); Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
 115 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420. 
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the authorization that might otherwise have existed.116  Thus, under 
the Citrin standard, an employee is “unauthorized” when she never 
had authorization to begin with, as well as when she accesses the 
computer in a way that contradicts the employer’s interest.117 
However, the Ninth Circuit has declined to read an agency-
based theory into the scope of authorization.118  Instead, it has 
embarked on a more literal application.  Beginning with LVRC 
Holdings LLC v. Brekka, the Ninth Circuit narrowly construed 
“authorization,” such that when an employee is given permission 
to access the employer’s computer, any subsequent permitted use 
of the computer is considered “authorized,” regardless of its 
wrongfulness.119  More recently, the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
Brekka application of “without authorization,” but toyed with the 
scope of “exceeds authorized access.”120  After hearing the case en 
banc, the court similarly adhered to a more technical understanding 
of “authorization,” holding that an employee only “exceeds 
authorized access” when she is given permission to access certain 
information on a computer but then accesses information beyond 
that which she is permitted to access, and not when she misuses the 
information.121 
The premise of this circuit split appears to be based on a fine 
line between “improper access of computer information” versus 
“misuse or misappropriation.”122  Essentially, under an agency-
based theory, an employee is unauthorized to access a protected 
computer when she does so in violation of the employer’s interest.  
Under the Ninth Circuit’s more narrow interpretation, an employee 
is unauthorized when she never had permission to access the 
 
 116 Id. at 420–21. 
 117 See id. at 420 (deciding agency law defined “authorization”); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958) (“[T]he authority of the agent terminates if, without 
knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a 
serious breach of loyalty to the principal.”). 
 118 United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 676 F.3d 
854 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 119 LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (clarifying 
that “without authorization” means “without any permission at all”). 
 120 See Nosal II, 676 F.3d 854. 
 121 See id. at 857. 
 122 See id. at 863. 
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computer to begin with or when she is authorized to access the 
computer but accesses information that she was not permitted to 
access, regardless of how she subsequently uses the information. 
c) Definition of “Loss” 
The CFAA defines “loss” as 
any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost 
of responding to an offense, conducting a damage 
assessment, and restoring the data, program, system 
or information to its condition prior to the offense, 
and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other 
consequential damages incurred because of the 
interruption of service.123 
This definition of “loss” can be described as two types of 
losses: response costs and interruption of service damages.124  
Reasonable response costs may include expenses towards 
discovering the identity of the offender, assessing the damage to a 
hacked system, and upgrading security.125  Interruption of service 
damages may include loss of revenue, but only if the loss results 
directly from the unauthorized access itself.126  On the other hand, 
claims for “lost business opportunities, damaged reputation, loss of 
assets, and other missed revenue,” usually do not constitute 
“loss.”127  Given the narrow scope of eligible “losses,”128 this 
element may pose the greatest challenge for companies claiming 
ownership of an SMA under the CFAA. 
 
 123 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (2006). 
 124 “[T]he term “loss” means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of 
responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, 
program, system or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, 
cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of 
service.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11); see also Tuma, supra note 89, at 185. 
 125 See AtPac, Inc. v. Aptitude Solutions, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1184 (E.D. Cal. 
2010); see also Tuma, supra note 89, at 187. 
 126 See AtPac, 730 F.Supp.2d at 1184–85. 
 127 Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 WL 4739436, at *7 ( E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012). 
 128 See AtPac, 730 F.Supp.2d at 1185. 
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II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS FAIL TO ESTABLISH 
OWNERSHIP RIGHTS TO SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS 
The rise in litigation over the ownership of SMAs presents new 
challenges to the scope and relevance of intellectual property laws, 
namely Trademark, Copyright, and Trade Secrets.  An analysis of 
how the three intellectual property regimes would apply to the 
issue of ownership further highlights the challenges and limitations 
of intellectual property as the governing body of law over SMAs.  
This section will first highlight the practical inadequacies of using 
Trademark, Copyright, and Trade Secrets to determine ownership 
rights to an SMA.  Then, this section will discuss the theoretical 
underpinnings of why SMAs are unsuitable for intellectual 
property protection. 
A. Intellectual Property Laws as Applied to Social Media 
Accounts: Failure to Protect Key Assets 
The key assets of an SMA consist of the access information, 
the subscribers, and the content.129  Ownership of an SMA allows 
one to, exclusively, reap the benefits that flow from these assets.  
This section will go through the relevant application of each 
intellectual property regime to this issue of SMA ownership—
revealing how intellectual property laws only provide partial 
ownership rights. 
1. Trademark 
The value of a trademark stems from the association between 
the mark and the product or service, “to secure to the owner of the 
mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of 
consumers to distinguish among competing producers.”130  Many 
businesses incorporate their protected marks in an SMA’s account 
name, functioning as a way to notify subscribers that that particular 
SMA is associated with that particular business.  When individuals 
that are hired to manage these SMAs on behalf of the company 
leave the company and continue to operate the SMAs, there are 
two possible scenarios for a trademark claim: (1) the former 
 
 129 See supra Part I.B. 
 130 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992). 
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employee keeps the same account name, or (2) the former 
employee changes the account name.131  In both instances, whether 
or not there is a trademark infringement would depend on the 
likelihood of confusion.132 
a) Likelihood of Confusion 
The main factors at issue would most likely be the similarity 
between the two names and the similarity between the services 
offered.  With regard to the similarity between the names, courts 
“analyze the mark[s’] overall impression on a consumer, 
considering the context in which the marks are displayed and the 
totality of the factors that could cause confusion.”133  As such, if 
the former employee changes the name so that the SMA no longer 
incorporates the company’s mark, or only retains a portion of the 
company’s mark, then it would be more difficult for the company 
to establish sufficient similarity between the two names.134 
With regard to the similarity of the services, courts look to “the 
nature of the services and the structure of the relevant market and 
include[] consideration of the ‘class of consumers to whom the 
goods are sold.’”135  If the employee was hired specifically to 
promote the company’s products or services, and after the name 
change continues to post content referencing the company’s 
products or services, then this factor would likely weigh in favor of 
finding a likelihood of confusion.  This would be further 
substantiated by the high probability that the audience—the 
 
 131 See supra Part I.B. 
 132 See id. 
 133 New York City Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 305, 
316–17 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 134 For example, if an SMA name was originally “PhoneDog_Noah” and changed to 
“PhoneReviewer_Noah,” it would be more difficult for the company to demonstrate a 
likelihood of confusion based on similarity of marks. See Everest Capital Ltd. v. Everest 
Funds Mgmt, LLC, 393 F.3d 755, 761 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that the use of a dominant 
word that is part of the protected product name insufficiently similar).  Not to mention, 
PhoneDog did not even assert a Lanham Act claim for Kravtiz’ use of the account. See 
PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. C 11 03474 MEJ, 2011 WL5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011).  
Conversely, Eagle v. Morgan serves as an example of when a plaintiff attempted to assert 
a Lanham Act claim after the account name was changed, and the court ruled otherwise. 
See Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 WL 4739436 ( E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012). 
 135 New York City Triathlon, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 317. 
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subscribers—would be predominantly the same as before the 
change.136  Additionally, if the name change is slight, the similar 
use could suggest the former employee’s intention to benefit from 
the protected mark’s good will.137  Nonetheless, although the 
subscribers may be effectively the same, a court may find that this 
particular class of consumers, the social media subscribers, are 
arguably savvy enough to know that the name change signifies the 
termination of a relationship between the poster and the company, 
or at least savvy enough to question if there still exists an 
association between the two.138  Whether and how the former 
employee changes the account name and subsequently uses the 
account greatly affects the availability of trademark protection. 
b) Limitations 
The strength of a trademark claim depends on the likelihood of 
confusion as to the association between the SMA and its owner, 
primarily through the name of the account.  This, however, fails to 
fully address the issue of who owns the SMA, because the focus of 
the analysis is not on whom the account belongs to, but rather turns 
on who has the ability to change the name of the account—
regardless of whether or not that access is proper.139  Moreover, 
trademark law does not directly address any of the main assets of 
an SMA.  There is no infringement claim available over the 
ownership of the content posted, the subscribers, nor the access 
information.  Instead, trademark law only governs the ownership 
rights to use the mark, not the account.  If anything, ownership of a 
mark might undermine ownership of an SMA, at least where the 
employee completely changes the name and use of an SMA.  
Given that the key requirement is a protectable mark, the 
protection afforded by trademark law goes to the owner of that 
 
 136 Id. (finding a likelihood of confusion where both parties marketed to and serviced 
the same individuals and organizations). 
 137 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 778 n.4 (1992). 
 138 See Yellobrix, Inc. v. Yellobrick Solutions, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 575, 581n.3 (E.D. 
N.C. 2011) (weighing the sophistication of technologically-savvy consumers towards 
finding an unlikelihood of confusion). 
 139 See, e.g., Eagle, 2012 WL 4739436, at *2 (denying a Lanham Act claim where the 
defendant knew the plaintiff’s password to her LinkedIn account and changed the 
accounts name and photo).  
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mark,140 and where trademark law fails is in trying to translate that 
ownership right to that over an entire SMA. 
2. Copyright 
The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship,”141 
vesting in the owner of the work six exclusive rights, including the 
right to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works, and display 
the work publically.142  The Act also lists what categories of works 
are eligible for copyright protection.143  In terms of SMAs, 
copyright law may apply to each of the individual posts144 and to 
the SMA as a compilation.145  If either the posts or compilation are 
copyrightable, then ownership may be established under the work-
made-for-hire provision.146 
a) Individual Posts 
The content of each individual post may warrant copyright 
protection.  Individual posts, however, vary in length, subject-
matter, and style, creating a unique challenge to its copyright 
analysis.147  In terms of length, most posts via an SMA are 
relatively short and may be limited to a specific number of 
characters,148 or inherently limited by the very purpose of the 
 
 140 See Nasdaq Stock Mkt, Inc. v. Archipelago Holdings, LLC, 336 F. Supp. 2d 294, 
304 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).   
 141 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 142 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 143 17 U.S.C. § 102(1)–(8). 
 144 Individual posts may qualify as literary works.  The Copyright Act defines literary 
works as  
works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or 
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature 
of the material objects, such as books, pamphlets, periodicals, 
manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they 
are embodied. 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 145 See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).  
 146 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 147 See generally, e.g., Adam S. Nelson, Tweet Me Fairly: Finding Attribution Rights 
Through Fair Use in the Twittersphere, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 
697, 728 (2012) (“Without empirical evidence, there is no way to estimate what 
percentage of tweets might be protectable.”). 
 148 For example, Twitter limits each tweet to 140 characters.   
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post—to convey an instant, temporary message.  Similarly, the 
actual content of the post may range from anecdotal, such as a 
particular experience at a certain venue, to informative, such as 
notification of a promotional deal.  Courts generally adhere to the 
idea that there is a reciprocal relationship between creativity and 
independent effort, where the “smaller the effort the greater must 
be the degree of creativity.”149  This is not to say that short 
sentences or simple phrases cannot be copyrighted.  “[T]he 
copyrightability of a very short textual work—be it word, phrase, 
sentence or stanza—depends on the presence of creativity.”150 
The purpose of the post helps elucidate its creativity, or lack 
thereof.  A concrete tenet of copyright is that where the 
“expression of [the] idea is indistinguishable from the idea itself, it 
is not entitled to copyright protection.151  A post that aligns with a 
“form[] of expression dictated solely at functional considerations,” 
will most likely be found to “display[] no creativity 
whatsoever.”152  In the case of the SMAs at issue, this poses the 
main challenge.  If the individual post merely notifies the 
subscribers of promotional deals, the argument for originality is 
undermined by the post’s primary purpose—a business function.  
However, if the posts are more substantive or anecdotal, like an in-
depth product review, they would more likely warrant copyright 
protection.  Although most SMA posts for business purposes may 
generally lack sufficient creativity, the ultimate determination still 
depends on the specific facts of each case. 
b) As a Compilation 
Given the legal and practical limitations to the copyright 
protection of individual posts, businesses may consider protecting 
their entire social media account as a compilation.153  The 
 
 149 Stern v. Does, No. CV 09—01986 DMG (PLAx), 2011 WL 997230, (C.D. Cal. Feb. 
10, 2011) (citing Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511. F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir. 
1975)). 
 150 Id. at *6. 
 151 Feist Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991) (“This is 
because facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship.”). 
 152 Stern, 2011 WL 997230 at *6 (finding a twenty-three word listserv post asking if 
anyone had a bad experience with the defendant’s services, lacked sufficient originality). 
 153 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
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Copyright Act defines a compilation as a “work formed by the 
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that 
are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the 
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of 
authorship.”154  Compilations may consist of material that is not 
within the subject matter of copyright, i.e. individual posts that 
serve a functional purpose.155  Even so, compilations must satisfy 
the statutory requirement of originality.156  The key to copyright 
protection for a compilation work is the selection, coordination, or 
arrangement of the preexisting material.157 
Compilations are considered original when an author 
independently chooses the selection and arrangement of the 
material in a manner that reflects some creativity.158  Copyright 
protection for the compilation as a whole, however, does not bleed 
into the individual elements that are compiled.159  In the case of 
social media accounts, the ability to select and arrange the 
elements of the page is not within the owner’s control—that 
control is exercised by the social media website.160  The location of 
where the posts are displayed for an account, where the name of 
the account is displayed, and where the subscriber may connect 
with the account, is the same for each social media account for that 
particular platform.161  Although copyright protection may be 
available to compilations that consist of material like that of the 
posts on an SMA,162 the very fact that the arrangement of how the 
information is communicated to the subscribers is within the 
control of the social media platform undermines finding copyright 
 
 154 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 155 See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
 156 See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
 157 See 17 U.S.C. § 103. 
 158 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 159 See id.  
 160 See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, Facebook Shows Off New Home Page Design, Including 
Bigger Pictures, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2013, at B4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/technology/facebook-shows-off-redesign.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing how the company redesigned the user page to display 
larger photos and links). 
 161 See, e.g., id. 
 162 See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
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protection of each individual social media account as a compilation 
work. 
c) Work-Made-For-Hire 
Assuming an SMA is copyrightable, as either individual posts 
or a compilation, the issue then becomes ownership of the 
copyrighted SMA.  In weighing the factors delineated in 
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,163 certain aspects of 
the employment relationship will weigh towards finding the hired 
party an employee rather than an independent contractor, and vice 
versa.  Facts that would support an employer-employee 
relationship, where the company possesses the “right to control the 
manner and means by which the product is accomplished,”164 may 
include the company supplying the tools,165 (i.e., the username and 
password, and in some instances a computer or cell phone); the 
company hiring the individual with long-term intentions rather 
than for temporary work;166 the hired party’s compensation is not 
dependent on the completion of a specific job;167 and if the hired 
party only manages the SMA of one company at a time.168  
However, facts that sound in independent discretion might favor 
finding the hired party as an independent contractor.169  For 
example, if the hired party is given the access information or a 
company laptop to work from and is capable of posting from any 
location, such mobility and discretion might undermine an 
 
 163 490 U.S. 730, 731 (1989).     
 164 Id. at 751. 
 165 See id. at 751–52 (stating that the fact the hired party “supplied his own tools,” 
favored finding him an independent contractor). 
 166 See, e.g., id. at 752–53 (listing a hired party “retained for less than two months, a 
relatively short period of time” as a factor towards finding an independent contractor 
relationship). 
 167 See, e.g., Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d 1532, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that 
compensation based on completion of a specific job is typically found in an independent 
contractor relationship). 
 168 See, e.g., Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989) (listing 
working for multiple businesses as an indication of an independent contractor 
relationship). 
 169 See CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751–52 (laying out factors that suggest an independent 
contractor relationship). 
C05_MIAO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2013  3:40 PM 
1046 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1017 
employment relationship.170  Furthermore, the lack of daily 
supervision and control over the details of the work (i.e., the 
content or frequency of the posts) would also suggest the hired 
party is an independent contractor and not an employee.171 
Although certain aspects of the job—access, flexibility, and 
deference to manage an SMA—typically align with characteristics 
of an independent contractor, these elements may carry less weight 
in this context because companies hire such social media managers 
with the very intention that the manager runs the account.172  Also, 
these aspects are not without boundaries.  The hired party cannot 
simply post anything she wants; rather, the job usually requires the 
manager to use the SMA to improve brand awareness or boost web 
traffic on behalf of the company.173  In balancing these factors, it 
would seem that an SMA is the work product of an employee—the 
kind of work “motivated by a desire to further [the company’s] 
corporate goals.”174  Ownership rights, then, would belong to the 
employer.  On the other hand, finding the hired party as an 
independent contractor limits the company’s ability to assert 
ownership rights; the only way for the company to claim 
ownership of the SMA would be if it fits within one of the nine 
categories of “specially or commissioned” works and if there is a 
written agreement signed by both parties explicitly indicating that 
the work is a work-made-for-hire as understood under the 
 
 170 But see Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571–72 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that 
“courts have tended no to grant employees authorship rights solely on the basis that the 
work was done at home on off-hours”). 
 171 See, e.g., CCNV, 490 U.S. at 752 (listing the impossibility for daily supervision 
because the artist worked in his own studio and freedom to decide when and how long to 
work as reasons for finding an independent contractor relationship). 
 172 Not to mention, the Supreme Court’s rejection of applying the actual control (how 
closely the hiring party monitors the production process) and right to control (the hiring 
party’s ability to control the product) test in determining whether or not a hired party is 
an employee. See id. at 750. 
 173 See, e.g., PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. C 1103474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (describing the hired party’s duties, which include promoting 
the company’s services); see also LAWRENCE RAGAN COMM’N, INC. & NASDAQ OMX, 
STRUCTURING A SOCIAL MEDIA TEAM 13 (2012), available at 
http://web.ragan.com/raganforms/Structuring_A_Social_Media_Team.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2013). 
 174 See Avtec Sys., 21 F.3d at 572 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 236, 
cmt. b (1958)). 
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Copyright Act.175  Nevertheless, ownership rights to an SMA, 
under the work-made-for-hire provision, ultimately depend on the 
existence of a valid copyright.176 
d) Limitations 
With regard to the three main assets of an SMA, copyright law 
actually speaks directly to one—the content.  If individual posts 
are deemed copyrightable, then this framework is one step closer 
to establishing ownership rights to the SMA.  However, as the 
analysis above demonstrates, the copyrightability of individual 
posts is questionable.177  Even assuming the individual posts are 
copyrightable, this does not clarify ownership rights to the 
remaining assets of an SMA—the access information and 
subscribers.178  If the posts are found to be copyrightable and the 
owner is the employee, the ownership dispute over the actual 
account would still remain.  Although the work-made-for-hire 
provision appears as an efficient solution—speaking directly to 
ownership—the ownership rights afford are limited to all “the 
rights comprised in the copyright.”179  Taking the previous 
scenario, the employer may then own the copyrights to the posts, 
but still the issue of who owns the access information and 
subscribers remains unresolved.  As such, to the extent individual 
posts are copyrightable, copyright law can only provide partial and 
limited ownership of an SMA. 
3. Trade Secrets 
The essence of a trade secret is “the secrecy of [the] 
information” that gives the owner a competitive advantage over its 
 
 175 See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2006). 
 176 See supra Part II.A.2.a–b. 
 177 See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
 178 Finding originality in the access information and subscribers would far more 
challenging than in the individual posts.  Arguably, access information serve a functional 
purpose—to log-in to the account, and subscriber lists are merely names—facts. See Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991); Stern v. Does, No. CV 
09—01986 DMG (PLAx), 2011 WL 997230, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2011), aff’d  No. 
11-55436, 2013 WL 1137390 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2013). 
 179 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006). 
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competitors.180  Trade secret disputes are common in the employer-
employee context, which supports its popular use in recent SMA 
litigation.181  Additionally, the scope of what may constitute a trade 
secret can be applied broadly—any “information . . . that derives 
independent economic value . . . from  . . . not being generally 
known.”182  SMAs, as an emerging business tool, present an 
interesting challenge to the traditional understanding of trade 
secrets law, namely whether access information and subscribers 
may be trade secrets. 
a) Access Information 
The question of whether access information, the username and 
password, may be considered trade secrets has been addressed in a 
few jurisdictions.  For example, in Virginia, courts have found that 
access-passwords, those “whose only value is to access other 
potentially valuable information,” are not trade secrets.183  
Similarly, in applying Pennsylvania law, the court in Eagle v. 
Morgan determined that an employer identification 
number/password did not possess any economic value, and thus, 
could not be a trade secret.184  In California, the courts have not 
dismissed the possibility that access information may constitute 
trade secrets,185 but they have yet to rule on the actual merits of the 
issue.186 
 
 180 Sys. Dev. Services, Inc. v. Haarmann, 389 Ill.App.3d 561, 572 (Ill 2009) (quoting 
Pope v. Alberto Culver Co., 296 Ill.App.3d 512 (1998)). 
 181 See supra Part I.B. 
 182 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). 
 183 See Tryco., Inc. v. U.S. Med. Source, LLC, No. CL-2009-8914, 2010 WL 7373703, 
at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 3, 2010); see also State Analysis, Inc. v. Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n, 
621 F. Supp. 2d 309, 321 (E.D. Va. 2009) (finding a password that merely provides 
access not a trade secret).    
 184 Eagle v. Morgan, Civil Action No. 11-4303, 2011 WL 6739448, at *11 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 22, 2011). 
 185 See, e.g., Therapeutic Research Faculty v. NBTY, Inc., 488 F.Supp.2d 991, 999 
(E.D. Cal. 2007); TMX Funding, Inc., v. Impero Tech., Inc., No. C 10-00202 JF (PVT), 
2010 WL 2509979, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2010); PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. C1103474 
MEJ, 2011 WL5415612, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011).   
 186 In all three cases, Therapeutic Research, TMX Funding, and PhoneDog, the 
California courts only denied motions to dismiss, and so far, only the parties in 
PhoneDog reached a settlement. See Therapeutic Research, 488 F.Supp.2d at 999; TMX 
Funding, 2010 WL 2509979, at *4; PhoneDog, 2011 WL5415612, at *7; Stipulation for 
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In those jurisdictions that have yet to address this question, 
whether or not access information constitutes trade secrets will be 
a highly fact-specific inquiry.  Looking to the elements of a trade 
secret, arguments can be made for and against each.  As the 
Virginia and Pennsylvania courts point out, one challenge with 
access information is satisfying the “independent economic value” 
requirement of a trade secret.  Arguably, the access information 
possess some economic value—they are the key to accessing the 
coveted information or discovery—but it is far more difficult to 
argue they possess any independent economic value.187  The 
argument being the username and password combination is merely 
a barrier and does not itself give rise to a substantial business 
advantage.188  With regard to the actual secrecy of the access 
information, facts that support finding a trade secret would be if 
the employer identified the information as confidential and only 
the account manager knew the password.189  However, if the 
employee created the password, and the employer never knew the 
password, then these facts could go against finding a trade secret—
suggesting the employer failed to maintain its secrecy.190  Lastly, 
as one court suggested,191 the username/password combination 
may fail to even satisfy the first requirement of a trade secret, 
because it is not actual information.192 
 
Dismissal After Settlement, PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. 3:11-cv-03474-MEJ, 2013 WL 
207773 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013). 
 187 See State Analysis, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 321. 
 188 See id. at 321; see also Sasqua Group, Inc. v. Courtney, No. CV 10-528 (ADS) 
(AKT), 2010 WL 3613855, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2010). 
 189 But see Agency Solutions.com, LLC v. TriZetto Grp., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1015 
(E.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that labeling information “Confidential” cannot enlarge the 
scope of a trade secret). 
 190 See Sasqua Group, 2010 WL 3613855, at *17 (considering whether trade secret 
protection should be afforded when the plaintiff did not acquire the information itself). 
 191 See MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp. 2d 309, 429 n.4 (E.D. 
Va. 2004) (doubting whether or not a CD Key constitutes a trade secret where is it just a 
series of random numbers and not information). 
 192 See Agency Solutions.com, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 1016–17 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (finding a 
trade secret tends to be an idea that “communicate[s] (disclose[s]) the idea or fact to 
another,” and where the information only identifies functionality, it is not a trade secret) 
(quoting Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp., 184 Cal.App.4th 210, 220–21 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010)). 
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b) Subscriber Lists 
The trade secrets claim most related to the subscribers of a 
social media account is one regarding customer lists.193  Customer 
lists have long been recognized as information that qualifies for 
trade secret protection.194  The proprietary information in customer 
lists may vary, but most claims tend to include proprietary 
information such as the names of customers, customer preferences, 
and pricing strategies.195  Additionally, customer lists are usually 
stored in a computer database or filing system.196  Although 
customer lists tend to be recognized trade secrets, it is another 
question whether a subscriber list to an SMA is sufficiently 
comparable. 
The first issue is whether a subscriber list constitutes 
“information.”  Information in a customer list satisfies the first 
requirement of a trade secret where it consists of information 
including customer preferences, special pricing, or any other 
personal notes.197  However, if the list merely contains public 
information, it will not fall within trade secret protection.198  A 
subscriber list generally just lists the names or even just usernames 
of it subscribers,199 is most likely public information, and if 
anything, the information about each subscriber is not specifically 
tailored to the benefit of the business.200  A list of names or basic 
information, even if public, may be protectable, but only if there is 
 
 193 Customer lists may also be referred to as client lists. 
 194 See Kewanee Oil Co., v. Bicron Corp, 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) (noting how 
protecting customer lists as trade secrets “encourages businesses to initiate new and 
individualized plans of operation, and constructive competition results”).  
 195 See, e.g., Sasqua Group, Inc. v. Courtney, 2010 WL 3613855 (E.D. N.Y. Aug. 2, 
2010) (referring to other cases involving customer lists such as North Atlantic, Webcraft 
Technologies, 674 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). 
 196 See cited cases supra Part I.C.3. 
 197 See, e.g., Fireworks Spectacular, Inc. v. Premier Pyrotechnics, Inc., 86 F.Supp.2d 
1102, 1106 (D. Kan. 2000). 
 198 See, e.g., Fireworks, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; see also UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 
§ 1(4) (1985). 
 199 See, e.g., FAQs About Following, TWITTER HELP CENTER, 
http://support.twitter.com/articles/14019-faqs-about-following (last visited Mar. 25, 
3013).  
 200 See, e.g., id. (explaining how followers to a Twitter account see the account holder’s 
tweets).   
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some extra degree of work involved in putting the names on a 
list.201  In the case of SMAs, however, it is not the account holder 
that puts the names on the subscriber list, it is the subscribers 
themselves that elect to be on the list.202  These factors suggest that 
the type of information actually involved, such as usernames, falls 
outside of that which is protected by trade secrets law. 
Moreover, a subscriber list must not be “readily ascertainable” 
by others who would gain a competitive advantage by disclosing or 
using the information.203  The first part of this element strikes at a 
pivotal factor with an SMA—its visibility.  Subscribers to an SMA 
are generally visible to the public.204  In fact, a company’s 
subscriber list is intended to be publicly visible, because it allows 
its current and potential subscribers to see who else is subscribed, 
whether it be a friend, a celebrity, or a trusted voice in the industry, 
adding to brand reputation or credibility.  Not only does a 
subscriber list’s visibility contribute to its ascertainability, but also 
the ability to create or duplicate the list.205 (For example, a 
 
 201 See Fireworks, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 (finding a customer list a trade secret where 
the company compiled its list over many years and thousands of hours); N. Atl. 
Instruments, Inc. v. Haber, 188 F.3d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding a client list a 
protectable trade secret where the list “took great time and effort to compile, including 
‘development of a specialized knowledge of the customer’s operations and needs’”) 
(quoting Webcraft Techs., Inc. v. McCaw, 674 F. Supp. 1039, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). 
 202 See, e.g., FAQs About Following, TWITTER HELP CENTER, 
http://support.twitter.com/articles/14019-faqs-about-following (last visited Mar. 25, 
3013) (explaining how followers choose which Twitter accounts to follow); see also 
Amanda Ashworth, Twitter Tips for Proper Use by Brands, SOCIALMEDIA TODAY (Jan. 
21, 2013), http://socialmediatoday.com/recsocially/1173366/brands-simply-aren-t-using-
twitter-or-aren-t-using-it-properly (explaining how brands see Twitter as a one-way 
channel, using it as they would traditional mediums like TV or print). 
 203 See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985). 
 204 Anyone with an SMA on the same platform can view the subscriber list to that 
account by clicking on a “followers” (for Twitter) or “friends” (for Facebook) tab. See, 
e.g., Timeline, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, https://www.facebook.com/ 
help/115450405225661 (stating that the default setting allows “everyone [to] see who 
your friends are”). 
 205 See, e.g., Sasqua Group, Inc. v. Courtney, No. CV 10-528 (ADS)(AKT), 2010 WL 
3613855, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2010) (denying trade secret protection to a client list 
based on the “exponential proliferation of information made available through full-blown 
use of the Internet and the powerful tools it provides to access such information . . . a 
very different story”). 
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competitor could, after viewing the subscribers to a company’s 
SMA, contact each of those subscribers.) 
The second half of the “readily ascertainable” factor considers 
the competitive advantage conferred to a trade secret holder from 
the secrecy of the information—the independent economic value of 
a trade secret.206  Evidence of independent economic value varies 
based on the facts of each case.  If the company can show that the 
subscriber list is the but-for cause of its success or can provide 
similar evidence that the subscriber list gives the company a 
competitive advantage over its competitors, this factor would 
weigh in favor of finding the list a valid trade secret.207  The 
economic advantage provided must also be a result of the list’s 
confidentiality.208  The subscribers to an SMA undoubtedly 
possess some economic value,209 i.e. developing brand awareness, 
but whether or not the secrecy of the list actually confers a 
competitive advantage worthy of trade secret protection is 
questionable.210 
c) Limitations 
Trade secrets law protects confidential business information 
with two policy goals in mind: (1) promoting standards of 
commercial ethics, and (2) encouraging invention.211  The idea, of 
course, is that there are certain discoveries that are not protectable 
or not best protected under patent law.212  Whether an owner of an 
 
 206 See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (4) (1985). 
 207 See Sasqua Group, 2010 WL 3613855, at *19 (citing Dorazio v. Capitol Specialty 
Plastics, Inc., 2002 WL 31750215, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 9, 2002)); see also Fireworks 
Spectacular, Inc. v. Premier Pyrotechnics, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1006 (D. Kans. Feb. 23, 
2000) (pointing to the defendant’s admission that without the list he would have lost 
money support for finding a trade secret). 
 208 See Fireworks, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1006. 
 209 See Amanda Ashworth, Twitter Tips for Proper Use by Brands, SOCIALMEDIA 
TODAY (Jan. 21, 2013), http://socialmediatoday.com/recsocially/1173366/brands-simply-
aren-t-using-twitter-or-aren-t-using-it-properly. 
 210 “The information at issue must be substantially secret to impart economic value to 
both its owner and its competitors because of its relative secrecy.” See Sys. Dev. Servs., 
Inc. v. Haarmann, 389 Ill.App.3d 561, 572 (Ill. App. 5th 2009) (quoting Pope v. Alberto 
Culver Co., 296 Ill.App.3d 512 (Ill. App. 1st 1998)). 
 211 See Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). 
 212 See id. at 483. 
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SMA can claim that account as a trade secret, however, is doubtful.  
The key to an eligible trade secret is not just that it is secret, but 
that its secrecy is a source of competitive advantage.  As discussed 
above, the owner of an SMA faces substantial challenges in 
proving the access information and subscriber lists are trade 
secrets.213  In addition to those obstacles, trade secrets law fails to 
address a key component of an SMA—the posted content.  This 
makes sense, as posted content clearly cannot be a secret.  As with 
copyright law, the ability for trade secrets law to establish 
ownership rights over the entire SMA is also limited. 
B. Social Media Accounts Are Not Intellectual Property 
Applying traditional intellectual property laws to SMA 
ownership disputes between employers and employees reveals the 
challenge in aligning social media accounts with traditional 
examples of intellectual property.  Despite efforts by recent 
litigants to squeeze SMAs into recognized intellectual property 
regimes,214 the actual application of these laws to the SMA as a 
whole, comprised of its three main assets, reveals the various 
shortfalls of this approach.215  The incongruence between SMAs 
and intellectual property does not exist simply because no 
intellectual property regime can protect all three assets of an SMA.  
If anything, the difficulty in applying these laws to SMAs 
corroborates the more theoretical reasons why SMAs fall outside 
intellectual property. 
A prominent view of intellectual property law is that it 
functions as an incentive-based legal framework, where granting 
exclusive rights over one’s creative works rewards the owner for 
her creativity.216  Not only does intellectual property law aim to 
provide an incentive to innovate, it also functions to promote the 
distribution of the creative works.217  In doing so, as the Supreme 
Court stated in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., “the productive 
 
 213 See supra Part IIA.3.a–b. 
 214 See supra Part I.B. 
 215 See supra Part I.A. 
 216 Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
317, 318 (2011). 
 217 Id. at 318 n.3. 
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effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society 
through the introduction of new products and processes of 
manufacture into the economy.”218  The Internet itself has spurred 
a new wave of innovation,219 and considering social media’s 
current pervasive dominance on the Internet, the use of SMAs 
commercially has undoubtedly contributed to the developments in 
new business methods and interactive technologies.220  Based on 
such motivations, it is not surprising that litigants instinctively turn 
to intellectual property laws when disputing ownership of an 
SMA.221  However, just because an issue involves the Internet, 
technology, or computers, does not mean it automatically becomes 
an intellectual property issue, and nor should it.222  Importantly, 
not relying on intellectual property laws does not necessarily 
jeopardize the value or commercial growth of social media.223 
If the go-to legal frameworks have been intellectual property, 
and as suggested, improperly so, this leaves open what legal 
framework should be used to determine the ownership of an SMA.  
The following section presents the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
as convincing solution. 
III. THE CFAA AS THE APPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK FOR 
ESTABLISHING OWNERSHIP OF SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, commonly referred to as 
the classic anti-hacking statute,224 and more recently used to 
combat alleged employee misconduct,225 offers a compelling 
framework for determining ownership of an SMA.  The first, clear 
 
 218 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). The Court did not direct its statement at intellectual 
property law as a whole, but rather in an analysis of patent law and trade secrets law. 
 219 See Michael L. Rustad & Diane D’Angelo, The Path of Internet Law: An Annotated 
Guide to Legal Landmarks, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12, *30 (2011). 
 220 See Elefant, supra note 3, at 5–6. 
 221 See Rustad & D’Angelo, supra note 219, at *30–84 (describing in detail how the 
Internet has affect intellectual property law). 
 222 See Rosenblatt, supra note 216, at 321–22. 
 223 See generally id. (describing how industries have thrived creatively and 
economically absent robust intellectual property law protection). 
 224 See Tuma, supra note 89, at 155–56. 
 225 See P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party and Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 
F.3d 504, 510 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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distinction between the CFAA and intellectual property law is its 
focus on the unauthorized access of a computer—and not the 
substance of the information obtained.226  Second, as the legislative 
history has indicated,227 the type of violation envisioned under the 
CFAA is one that clearly identifies the property owner and the 
intruder.228  This section first describes the practical application of 
potential CFAA claims in the employer-employee SMA dispute.  
Then, this section hones in on the key to this ownership dispute—
authorization, and why the CFAA best addresses this issue. 
A. Potential Claims: The Intentional Access Subsection and The 
Intent to Defraud Subsection 
A company could assert a claim under the Intentional Access 
or the Intent to Defraud subsection when a former employee 
accesses an SMA account and changes the access information and 
account name.  The elements of a civil claim under The Intentional 
Access subsection, § 1030(a)(2)(C), are as follows: 
(1)  intentional access of a computer, 
(2)  without authorization or exceeding authorized 
access, 
(3)  thereby obtaining information 
(4) from any protected computer (if the conduct 
involved interstate or foreign communication), and 
(5)  a loss to one or more persons during any one-
year period aggregating at least $5,000 in value.229 
The elements of a civil claim under the Intent to Defraud 
subsection, § 1030 (a)(4), are as follows: 
(1)  access of a protected computer, 
(2)  without authorization or exceeding authorized 
access, 
(3)  knowingly and with intent to defraud, thereby 
 
 226 See, e.g., Brenton, supra note 99, at 441 (identifying how the CFAA can “protect 
information that trade secret law would hold unprotectable”). 
 227 See Kapitanyan, supra note 90, at 410. 
 228 See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 
91 Cal. L. Rev. 439, 475–77 (2003) (describing how the CFAA exemplifies the concept 
of property owner and trespasser). 
 229 See LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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(4) furthering the intended fraud and obtained 
anything of value, causing 
(5)  a loss to one or more persons during any one-
year period aggregating at least $5,000 in value.230 
Since the major elemental difference between the two claims is 
that of fraud, this Note will approach the claims together, 
beginning with an analysis of whether or not the former 
employee’s actions were “without authorization” or “exceeded[ed] 
authorized access.”  Then, this section will proceed to analyze the 
Intent element under the Intentional Access subsection, the Fraud 
element under the Intent to Defraud subsection, and ending with 
the $5,000 loss requirement. 
1. Scope of Authorization 
The nuanced differences between the Citrin standard and the 
Brekka-Nosal standard bear significant implications for 
determining ownership of an SMA in the context of an employer-
employee dispute.  A “without authorization” argument most likely 
would only work in a Citrin jurisdiction, on the grounds that the 
employee was no longer employed by the company when she 
logged back in the SMA and changed the access information, 
undermining her duty of loyalty to the company.231  In comparison, 
a Brekka-Nosal jurisdiction would find it difficult to rule that the 
employee was “without authorization,” where she was given 
permission to access the SMA in the beginning.232  Given that the 
Citrin standard is an agency-based theory, it is not surprising that a 
CFAA claim would favor a finding that the SMA belonged to the 
company. 
Moreover, if the employee was given permission to log into the 
account, and after her employment ended, decided to access the 
account, the question of whether or not the employee “exceeded 
authorization,” would produce different results under Citrin and 
Brekka-Nosal.  Under Citrin, the employee would be found to have 
 
 230 See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1131. 
 231 Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21. 
 232 See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133 (clarifying that “without authorization” means 
“without any permission at all”); Nosal II, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
(explaining that “without authorization” applies to “outside” hackers). 
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unlawfully accessed the account, because the employee “resolved 
to act contrary to [the company’s] interest.”233 
On the other hand, the Brekka-Nosal standard would apply a 
narrower interpretation of authorization.  After Nosal II, it is not 
entirely clear if an employee, by merely changing the access 
information, would be considered to have “exceeded 
authorization” when the employee was permitted to access the 
social media website to begin with.  Nosal II states that one 
“exceeds authorized access” when an employee is authorized to 
access only certain information but then accesses unauthorized 
information; the issue of how the information is used is 
irrelevant.234  It appears, then, that the question is, does changing 
the password constitute a “use” violation or “access to 
unauthorized information”?235  Given the examples that the Ninth 
Circuit provides,236 it would appear the changing a password 
would be considered the latter, as an “unauthorized procurement or 
alternation of information.”237  Although this interpretation of the 
Nosal II favors company ownership, this standard of applying 
“exceeds authorization” is less certain than under the Citrin 
standard. 
2. Intent 
The Intentional Access subsection essentially requires an 
employee to intentionally access a computer, without authorization 
or exceeding authorized access, and obtain information from a 
protected computer.238  Whether an employee intentionally 
accesses a computer requires the employee’s conduct to “evince a 
clear intent to enter, without proper authorization, computer files 
 
 233 See Brekka, 581 F.3d 2233–34 (describing the Citrin holding). 
 234 See Nosal II, 676 F.3d at 863. 
 235 See id. at 858. 
 236 See id. at 860 (providing examples of potential liability to include “call[ing] family 
members from their work phones,” or “visiting www.daillysoduku.com from their work 
computers”). 
 237 See id. at 863 (quoting Shamrock Foods Co., Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 969, 965 (D. 
Ariz. 2008)). 
 238 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
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or data belonging to another.”239  Furthermore, the section “doesn’t 
not require proof of intent to defraud nor proof that the defendant 
knew the value of the information obtained.”240  A court may also 
look to the defendant’s “conscious objective,”241 but ultimately, the 
only proof necessary is “that the defendant intentionally accessed 
information from a protected computer.”242  In the context of 
SMAs, it is difficult to imagine how one may inadvertently access 
an account.243  The Nosal II court also highlighted the relationship 
between intent and authorization, suggesting that where one is 
found to be “without or [to] exceed authorization,” it is likely that 
one intended such access.244  As such, the act of entering in the 
access information may in and of itself corroborate intent.245 
3. Fraud 
Although the statute uses the term “fraud,” the CFAA does not 
require proof of common law fraud.246  Rather, the element of 
fraud under the Intent to Defraud subsection calls for a wrongdoing 
of more than unauthorized access, “a showing of some taking, or 
use, of information.”247  For an employer to prevail on an Intent to 
Defraud claim, it would have to prove that the defendant, through 
unauthorized access to a protected computer, obtained something 
of value with the intent to defraud.248  If it is assumed that the 
 
 239 United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 459 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing S. REP. No. 99-
432, at 5–6 (1986)). 
 240 U.S. v. Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 241 See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 459. 
 242 Willis, 476 F.3d at 1125. 
 243 Perhaps, one may inadvertently access another’s SMA if the SMA is set to 
automatically login. 
 244 In explaining why “exceed authorization” cannot extend to merely prohibited “use,” 
the court reasoned that if it did, then “subsection 1030(a)(2)(C), which makes it a crime 
to exceed authorized access of a computer connected to the Internet without any culpable 
intent,” would lead to “millions of unsuspecting individuals . . . find[ing] that they are 
engaging in criminal conduct.” See Nosal II, 676 F.3d at 860. 
 245 See Willis, 476 F.3d at 1125 n.1 (“[T]he Senate emphasized that ‘intentional acts of 
unauthorized access—rather than mistaken, inadvertent, or careless ones—are precisely 
what the Committee intends to proscribe’”) (quoting S. REP. No. 99-432 (1986)). 
 246 Tuma, supra note 89, at 163. 
 247 P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party and Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 
504, 509 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 248 Kapitanyan, supra note 90, at 416. 
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employee was without authorization or exceeded his authorized 
access when she logged into the social media website, simply 
logging in would not give rise to a section 1030(a)(4) violation.249  
However, if the employee logged in and used the account to 
promote her own business or that of a competitor, such conduct 
may constitute the “use and abuse of proprietary information,” and 
there would be a stronger argument for finding an intent to 
defraud.250  Similarly, it is possible that logging in and changing 
the password to an SMA demonstrates an intent to defraud. 
4. $5,000 Loss 
In most civil cases involving a former employee, the company 
must prove that one or more persons sustained a loss of $5,000 
over a one-year period as a result of an investigation, prosecution, 
or related course of conduct involving a CFAA violation.251  The 
damages typically alleged in cases involving an SMA include costs 
associated with replacing advertising252 and the value of the 
subscribers253—costs that are unlikely to be considered a “loss” 
under the CFAA, as they tend to fall in the category of lost 
business opportunities or missed revenue.254  However, this does 
not mean that there are not “losses” associated with investigating 
or assessing or repairing a company’s SMA.  Examples of such 
pleadable “losses” may include employee time or third party 
expenses the company incurs when reaching out to the social 
media website in an attempt to recover the account, or expenses 
 
 249 See, e.g., Multiven, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 725 F.Sup.2d 887, 893–94 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 
2010) (describing how the defendant demonstrated an intent to defraud where he 
requested the login information, logged in multiple times, and retrieved information). 
 250 See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 251 18 U.S.C. § 1030(5)(B)(i); Tuma, supra note 89, at 183. 
 252 Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 WL 4739436, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012).  
 253 First Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief; misappropriation of 
Trade Secrets; Intentional Interference with Prosepctive Economic Advantage; Negligent 
Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; and Conversion, at para. 19, 
PhoneDog v. Kravtiz, No. 3:11-cv-03474-MEJ, 2011 WL 6955632 (Nov. 29, 2011). 
 254 See Eagle, 2011 WL6739448, at *7. 
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associated with determining the value of the account to the 
business.255 
B. The Key Issue: Authorization 
The force behind the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as a 
criminal statute is unauthorized access to a protected computer, 
and the provision that allows for a private right of action for the 
same unauthorized access presents a unique opportunity to address 
the emerging issue of ownership rights in social media.256  With its 
focus on authorization, the CFAA arguably provides an 
advantageous framework for determining ownership over an SMA, 
because it recognizes and sufficiently protects the SMA as 
property257 and eliminates the need to expand, carve-out, or twist 
intellectual property laws. 
As with the relevant intellectual property regimes, the test as to 
whether the CFAA can establish ownership of an SMA is if the 
law adequately addresses each of the three main assets.  Access 
information in the form of a username or password is pivotal in 
determining authorization.  For example, under a Citrin standard, 
simply logging in the SMA to use the SMA in a manner contrary 
to the company’s interest can be seen as unauthorized—tipping the 
ownership balance in favor of the employer.258  Even under a 
Brekka-Nosal standard, logging in and changing the access 
information may amount to “exceed[ing] authorization,” which 
may weigh in favor of the employer or the employee, depending on 
which party is trying to establish ownership.259  With regard to 
subscribers and posted content, both represent the “information” at 
the other end of the access.  The CFAA better protects both of 
these assets, because unlike the intellectual property regimes—i.e. 
 
 255 See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel, 274 F.3d at 584–85, Creative Computing v. 
Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2004); see also, Tuma, supra note 89, at 
186–87. 
 256 See Brenton, supra note 99, at 429–30. 
 257 See Hunter, supra note 228, at 475–83 (describing how the “action becomes a 
trespass against a form of quasi land that exists online”). 
 258 See also Brenton, supra note 99, at 460. 
 259 For example, in Eagle v. Morgan, the company logged into the disputed LinkedIn 
account after the employee was terminated, prompting the employee to file a CFAA 
claim. See Eagle, 2012 WL 4739436, at *2.   
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copyright over posted content, and the subscriber list as a trade 
secret—the CFAA does not require that each represent proprietary 
information.260  The posted content does not have to be “original” 
and the subscriber list does not have to be “secret” to be covered 
under the CFAA.  At the end, embedded in the CFAA’s 
authorization element is an inherent determination of ownership. 
Lastly, the nature of the development of the CFAA also 
supports its applicability to social media governance.  Since its 
inception, the CFAA has been amended multiple times, fulfilling 
Congress’ intent to “keep pace with technological 
development.”261  Additionally, the baseline of the statute views 
computer networks and the Internet as “a place . . . just like the 
public roads that lead to private properties on which the defendant 
trespasses,”262 and doing so provides a more comprehensive legal 
framework for assessing the world of social media, particularly 
when compared to intellectual property laws.  Moreover, the social 
media industry, in its increasing ubiquity and robustness, is 
arguably an industry that will continue to develop and grow, as it 
has, without the need for intellectual property protection. 
CONCLUSION 
The increasing litigation over the ownership of SMAs presents 
new challenges to the scope and relevance of intellectual property 
laws, namely Trademark, Copyright, and Trade Secrets.  The 
discussion of how the three intellectual property regimes apply to 
the issue of ownership further highlights the challenges and 
limitations of intellectual property as the governing body of law 
over social media.  In comparison, the CFAA protects the SMA for 
what it is, and does so without forcing answers to equivocal 
questions such as whether the subscribers belong to the company 
or whether the posted content is sufficiently creative.  Rather, the 
 
 260 See Brenton, supra note 99, at 450 (explaining how accessing a list of director 
names, saved on a password-protected server, may give rise to a CFAA violation but not 
amount to misappropriation of a trade secret, because of the list’s public character). 
 261 See Kapitanyan, supra note 90, at 415–16 (citing S. REP. No. 104-357, at *5 (1986)). 
 262 See Hunter, supra note 228, at 477. 
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CFAA correctly captures the role of SMAs as another tool for 
business, not an independent innovation by a company. 
 
